Another step was taken toward undermining the adversarial nature of examining correction/deletion requests by subjects of wanted notices/diffusions at the 131st session of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF), held from January 27–31, 2025. This seems like a bonus for authoritarian regimes (especially Russia) and looks suspiciously like the latest effort by the new US administration to restore Putin's position on the international stage. The American chairmanship in the CCF may support this version.
Over the past year, the CCF has consistently expanded the employment of references to witness testimony as sufficient arguments to effectively demonstrate personal involvement in alleged criminal activity. However, before the last seating of its Requests Chamber, there did not appear to be such a defiant preference for these statements sourced by countries where witnesses could have given them under duress (torture or threats), particularly Russia. The issue is that the CCF gives them precedence over even court judgments and forensic examinations while hiding them from applicants until decisions on their merits are made.
Article 36 of the INTERPOL Constitution mandates that the CCF ensure that the processing of personal data complies with INTERPOL's rules, including examining and making decisions regarding requests to correct or delete data processed in the INTERPOL Information System (IIS). Any individual or entity shall have the right to submit a request for correction/deletion to the CCF against data processed in the IIS concerning that individual or entity (Article 29(1) of the CCF Statute). The CCF should consider the information and claims these applicants submit as part of its assessment (the anonymized CCF decision (2019—Decision Expert No.02) within its 107th session from the CCF’s public database, § 52).
INTERPOL's Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD) require that all data processed in the IIS be accurate and relevant (Article 12(1)). The quality requirements of the data and the relevant criteria imply the need for a clear and coherent description of the alleged criminal activities attributed to the wanted individual (the CCF decision of July 4, 2023, within its 125th session (ref. CCF/125/R687.22), § 37—not intended for public dissemination), including "the time and location of the alleged criminal activity" (the RPD Article 83(2)(b)(i)). The INTERPOL General Secretariat (IPSG) standards for the application of the RPD confirm that "for red notice requests and diffusions seeking the arrest of a person, it is important to provide sufficient facts that link the wanted individual to the charges against him/her" (the anonymized CCF decision (Decision No. 2023-02) from the CCF public database, § 15).
Therefore, the IIS information should show the individual's potential effective personal participation in the criminal conduct with which he/she is charged (ibid. § 16). CCF case law also requires an NCB to demonstrate a benefit from committing the offense (the anonymized CCF decision (Decision No. 2023-05) from the CCF public database, §27) and clarify the wanted individual's direct personal gain (the anonymized CCF decision (Decision No. 2023-01) from the CCF public database, § 38). If allegations contradict the forensic reports or the civil court's findings, an NCB must clarify this situation (the CCF decision of October 17, 2023, within its 126th session (ref. CCF/126/R906.22 & R907.22), §23—not intended for public dissemination). When several individuals are being sought in connection with the same alleged criminal activity, the personal data registered in the IIS concerning each of them should include a reference to the role allegedly played by each individual (the above CCF decision of July 4, 2023, § 40). Elements should also be provided to demonstrate that the wanted individual's actions do not relate to an administrative matter or derive from a private dispute (RPD Article 83(1)(a)(i)) and that the data is of interest for international police cooperation (ibid. § 37).
Still, the CCF is unconcerned with guilt or innocence. It is not empowered to investigate, weigh evidence, or determine the merits of a case. Only the competent national authorities may do so (the anonymized CCF decision (2025—Decision Excerpt No. 4) from the CCF public database, § 31). Instead, under the CCF Statute Articles 3(1)(a) and 33(3), the function of the CCF is to review whether the processing of data in the INTERPOL files meets INTERPOL's applicable legal requirements (the anonymized CCF decision (Decision No. 2023-04) from the CCF public database, § 39). As mentioned above, in fulfilling its functions per its Statute, the CCF determines whether an NCB source of the data provides concrete elements that are sufficiently precise and factual to establish the possible involvement of the wanted individual(s) in the acts with which they were charged (ibid.)—that is, whether the data (a) links the wanted individual(s) to the charges against them, (b) clearly describes the activities they are accused of, and (c) distinguishes their criminal nature rather than an administrative or civil character. This examination may constitute both a part of the predominance test of political/military character (the RPD Article 34(3)) and a separate check of judicial data quality/sufficiency compliance.
At the same time, the collision between admissible examination of data precision and forbidden weighing of evidence remains a challenge for the adversarial procedure. The CCF's last practice aggravated alarming trends in this issue when the CCF referred to its limited fact-finding function to prefer oral testimony of witnesses under the control of the search initiators over documentary-supported facts submitted by the wanted individuals. This is per se far from procedural equality, since it leads to an imbalance between the parties by depriving the wanted individuals of the opportunity to effectively exercise their right to challenge this data processed in the IIS. As a rule, the NCB's arguments and supporting materials are disclosed only by the CCF's final decision, which prevents the wanted individuals from being able to present counterarguments before the CCF makes its judgment on the merits. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found the right to an adversarial hearing means the opportunity for the parties to know and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed with a view to influencing the decision (Brandstetter v. Austria, § 67).
However, this problem is compounded when a red notice or diffusion comes from states that practice torture and threats to obtain the desired testimony. According to the ECHR, the admission of statements obtained as a result of torture or other ill-treatment as evidence to establish the relevant facts in criminal proceedings renders the proceedings as a whole unfair, irrespective of the probative value of the statements (Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 254). Even where the person from whom the evidence had thus been extracted was a third party, the use of evidence obtained by torture would amount to a flagrant denial of justice (Kormev v. Bulgaria, §§ 89–90). Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the CCF case law (the anonymized CCF decision (2025—Decision Excerpt No. 4) from the CCF public database, § 32), these issues may rise to the level of violating Article 2(1) of the INTERPOL Constitution, which requires police authorities to cooperate in "the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" UDHR). Statements made by witnesses in exchange for immunity or other advantages may also question the fairness of the hearing. Such statements are open to manipulation and may be made purely to obtain advantages or for personal revenge.
Russia is a typical specimen of such abusers. For example, the Russia 2023 Human Rights Report by the US Department of State indicated that law enforcement officers and security forces engaged in torture, abuse, and violence to coerce confessions.
That is why the CCF's undue preference for unquestioningly accepting testimony from this country is particularly worrying. Indeed, its 131st January session was unpleasantly amazed by the number of decisions supporting Russian NCB reasoned by witness statements being recognized as sufficient information to link applicants with alleged criminal activities recorded in red notices/diffusion requests. Although the overall statistics are still unknown, I have never been approached before by so many rejected applicants requesting legal assistance in revision. Their adverse decisions were similar in employing oral evidence submitted by the NCB to admit them as "sufficiently precise and factual elements to indicate the involvement of the wanted individuals in the alleged acts with which they were charged."
For example, the CCF found "the summaries of 14 witnesses' statements" provided by the Russian NCB sufficient to demonstrate the link between the applicant and the "organization of deliberate bankruptcy" (the CCF decision of January 29, 2025, within its 131st session, ref. CCF/131/R1.24—not intended for public dissemination). However, the CCF decision named only five of them, including the individual suspected of being a Russian administration trustee engaged in bypassing sanctions (§§ 17–22). Although this individual's role in Russia's anti-sanction plan was indicated as a reason for the applicant's persecution (§ 13), this did not bother the CCF. This was the only individual who managed and controlled the company when signs of bankruptcy appeared. Still, the CCF refused to "make any factual findings on the Applicant's arguments concerning whether he had control over the company or which factors caused its bankruptcy" (§ 28), notwithstanding the applicant's alleged criminal activities were "organization of deliberate bankruptcy." However, civil court judgements and forensic reports were the proverbial "icing on the cake." They established that the company had not been able to repay its debts because of the transactions made by the above-mentioned sanctioned individual rather than the applicant (§ 14). Nevertheless, the CCF prioritized the individual testimonies under the authorities' control over judicial acts and forensic examination.
The CCF's other decision referred to "statements and testimonies from 17 individuals" who "provided consistent and incriminating testimony against the Applicant and confirmed his connection" to the company involved in alleged fraud criminality by "concluding the delivery contract and not fulfilling its terms" (the CCF decision of January 28, 2025, within its 131st session, ref. CCF/131/R125.24, § 17—not intended for public dissemination). The applicant also provided the CCF with testimonies where witnesses stated that they were not acquainted with the applicant, did not know him, or could not remember him (§ 13). However, the CCF preferred testimonies submitted by the Russian NCB without naming them over the applicant's witnesses. When investigating a chance to request the CCF for revision, it turned out that the witnesses gave their testimony against the applicant under torture and threats, about which the NCB kept silent, of course.
The above is just a brief survey of this problem, using the CCF's last practice as an example. This does not seem to be an abstract concern. As of today, Russia is still responsible for a staggering 48.2% of all public Red Notices worldwide. In comparison, the United States has filed 3.6% and China 0.4%. The preceding shows that the CCF's procedure on this matter urgently needs to be adjusted to avoid any doubts with regard to political bias.
Aleksejs Jelisejevs
PhD Candidate in Law Science
Latvian lawyer practicing to protect human rights, focused on asylum and legal assistance in issues relating to the defense against illegal persecution by applying the mechanisms of INTERPOL. PhD Candidate in Law Science (Turiba University, Latvia) with a research background, expert experience, and a teaching portfolio.
